Secularism and secularization in Korea

In Korea, the separation of church and state takes on a particular significance: it emerges in the face of the historically close alliance between religion and power, and is redefined with the introduction of Protestantism at the end of the XIXᵉ century, marking the start of a process of secularization.

Sesokhwa, or Korean secularization

In the West, the concept of secularization generally refers to the separation of church and state. In Korea, on the other hand, the term is used differently and does not necessarily refer to the relationship between religion and political power, except when borrowed directly from Western literature.

Buddhism under Goryeo and the link with power

–Sesokhwa (세속화; 世俗化): this term is the Korean equivalent of “secularization” – it’s made up of sesok (세속; 世俗) “world” and hwa (화; 化) “to become”, thus literally meaning “to become profane” or “to return to the profane world”.

–Sesok (세속; 世俗): this term means “world” and is synonymous with sesok (속세; 俗世), “the profane world” in Buddhist vocabulary, designating everything that belongs to the profane, secular sphere.

–Sesokhwa (세속화 – secularization, “becoming profane”): this was a derogatory term used during the Goryeo kingdom (고려; 918- 1392). During this period, Buddhism was the state religion, referred to as Hoguk bulgyo(호국불교), or “state-protecting Buddhism”. Neo-Confucians accused Buddhists of “secularization”, i.e. of being corrupted by power and money and moving away from religious ethics.

Thus, Sesokhwa was used by neo-Confucians to designate the moral and spiritual corruption of monks, as well as their distancing from religious ethics in favor of worldly advantages.

Neo-Confucianism: sacred and profane intermingle

During the Joseon period (1392-1910), the literati developed a new, distinctive form of secularization: neo-Confucianism became the state ideology. This was not a religion in the strict spiritual sense, but a moral and political philosophy characterized by sacred rites, particularly to ancestors and sages.

Neo-Confucianism illustrates a phenomenon in which the sacred and the profane are intertwined: there is no strict separation between the religious and political dimensions – the state is governed by Confucian scholars, reflecting a phenomenon of integration of religion within the administration and political power. Royal rituals were celebrated by state officials, who took charge of building the Munmyo (문묘 – temple of great Confucian sages, built in 1395) and Jongmyo (종묘 – Confucian temple to the royal ancestors, where ancestral tablets were kept) temples. This system, designed to establish a symbolic and institutional link between Confucian morality and dynastic power, was inaugurated by Taejo (태조), founder of the Joseon dynasty.

The separation of state and religion: jeonggyo bunri

Until the end of the ^19th century, Confucianism was the state ideology in Korea: there was no clear distinction between religion and politics, and Confucian scholars directed and practiced rituals. They perform administrative functions and ritual practices simultaneously. The concept of a concrete separation between religion and state therefore does not really exist.

In Korea, the Western concept of religion was introduced when the country opened its ports in the 19th century. The Korean term Jonggyo (宗敎, 종교), which previously referred to “Confucian teaching” or “Confucian truth”, was reappropriated to match this new notion imported from the West.

This appropriation was positive, unlike in Japan and China: Korea saw religion as an instrument for maintaining national identity and modernizing the nation. Religion was seen as a symbol of civilization, while Christianity, particularly Protestantism, was associated with the success of Western civilization.

Introduction of Protestantism in Korea

Protestantism was introduced to Korea with the arrival of the first Protestant missionaries in 1884. Among them was Horace N. Allen, a missionary physician, won the confidence of the court by saving a wounded prince and opened the first Western hospital, presented as a symbol of both medical and religious modernity. This introduction came at a time when neo-Confucianism and the state were in full decline: neo-Confucianism was drifting away from the practical concerns of Korean society, and this disconnection led to a questioning of its practices, notably by the Silhak movement. As for the Korean state, it was affected by corruption and peasant revolts such as the Donghak movement in the 1890s.

A new religious and social legitimacy in Korea

Protestantism was quickly perceived as a vehicle for modernity and education, a major factor in the explosion in the number of believers in 1907. It thus acquired real legitimacy as soon as it was established in Korea. This was reinforced by Christianity’s role in social movements for liberation, particularly the March 1, 1919 movement. Protestant believers were also involved in the emancipation of women, for example through the creation of Ehwa College in 1910.

The democratic character of Protestantism was highlighted in a particularly hierarchical society dominated by a small elite of literati. The latter’s confiscation of the state, mixing the secular and the religious, was challenged by American Protestant missionaries and French Catholics, who introduced the idea of a separation between state and religious institutions. The aim was to avoid dependence on the Korean state and prevent the political instrumentalization of religious institutions. The king remained neutral in this regard, while missionaries enjoyed special protection, being subject to the laws of their country of origin.

Jeonggyo bunri, secularization in the Western sense

It’s in such a context that the term jeonggyo bunri (정교분리) appears, literally separation(분리 – bunri) of government(정치– jeongchi) and religion(^종교1- jonggyo). It corresponds to the modern concept of secularization in the Western sense.

The term emerged towards the end of the Joseon dynasty, grew stronger under Japanese colonization and was incorporated into the Korean constitution in 1948.

During Japanese colonization, Protestant churches and Buddhist schools demanded the separation of church and state, in order to be able to continue their religious activities without requiring authorization from the Japanese government. Secularization was seen as an “exit from politics” or an “exit from social involvement”, aimed at preserving autonomy and freedom in religious practice. The term Jeonggyo bunri is thus distinct from the concept of secularization used under Goryeo(sesokhwa).

Finally, this principle was enshrined in Article 20 of the Korean constitution as early as the First Republic, adopted in 1948. Under the influence of the American ally, the constitution affirmed freedom of religion and the separation of religious and political institutions, marking the official introduction of secularization in the Western sense in Korea(Jeonggyo bunri).

An ambiguous and blurred separation

Officially, the separation of religion and state is enshrined in the Constitution:

The principle of Jeonggyo bunri is interpreted as the religious neutrality of the state – no religion may be favored, discriminated against or granted tax privileges. Any law or policy must have a secular purpose and must neither promote nor restrain any religion. State symbols, such as the flag, the national anthem and official ceremonies, may not incorporate religious symbols.

In practice, however, this separation remains blurred and already has several limitations.

Under President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), the state indirectly favored Protestants.

Christmas was declared a public holiday, while Buddha’s birthday was not until 1975. Evangelism programs were broadcast by state radio stations, and Protestant churches enjoyed dazzling success and rapid development: the number of churches, the number of believers and their influence increased. The term Sesokhwa reappeared to denounce what some perceived as corruption and a loss of religious ethics, illustrated by the churches’ tendency to focus on money and material success. As under Goryeo, this moral critique denounced the worldliness of religious institutions and their mercantile tendencies.

1970s: Minjung sinhak (Minjung theology)

Against a backdrop of political repression, social inequality and brutal modernization under the Park Chung-hee regime, Minjung sinhak(민중신학), or “people’s theology”, emerges.

The term Minjung (민중) refers to the people, the popular mass, the oppressed (the South Korean people under Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship), while Minjung sinhak adapts the evangelical message to the South Korean political context, strongly marked by military dictatorship.

Inspired by theological currents from the West, notably Latin American liberation theology, this theology challenges Korean pastors, Christian intellectuals and progressive Protestant theologians: “If Jesus came to liberate the oppressed, shouldn’t our Christian faith also defend today’s oppressed?” (South Korean people).

The Minjung sinhak, established by progressive Korean Protestants and inspired by Western analyses of secularization, enables the development of a political reading of the Gospel in tune with Korean reality. It emphasizes the social and political commitment of believers and aims to combat dictatorship by linking Christian faith and social action, demonstrating that the Gospel can carry a message of political liberation.

Minjung sinhak according to progressive Protestants

Finally, Minjung sinhak is :

• A new vision of Christianity, rooted in Korean reality
• A critique of the conservative church, seen as complicit with the powers that be
• A theological commitment to democracy, human rights and social justice.

This trend was adopted by progressive Protestant churches, which became actively involved in the country’s democratization movements in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these committed churches encountered obstacles to their development due to their social commitment. The state’s treatment of churches under the dictatorship was differentiated according to their political leanings. Progressive churches fought against the regime in favor of democracy, resulting in numerous imprisonments. Conservative churches, on the other hand, avoided political involvement, citing anti-communism and the separation of state and religion. The latter benefit from state support, such as installation in privileged areas of Seoul, or special authorization to travel abroad. Official authorization for all was not granted until 1989.

Conservative Protestantism at the service of political power

Thus, two opposing currents coexist within Protestantism: progressive and conservative churches. The latter, the majority in Korea, strategically adapt their discourse to the political ideology of the state. Under Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial regime, they cultivated anti-communism among their congregations, aligning themselves with the government’s common ideological base of anti-communism, and religion became a tool for supporting the government. Under the regimes of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, they took part in humanitarian actions towards North Korea in a context of easing tensions between the two Koreas, initiated by Kim Dae-jung and his “Sunbeam” policy(haetbyeot jeongchaek – 햇볕 정책), created NGOs, and contributed to South Korea’s religious soft power.

Thus, conservative churches strategically and consistently maintain a certain ideological proximity to the state.

Consequently, since Park Chung-hee, they have benefited from financial support from the State, enabling them to set up NGOs as early as the 1990s, while the alliance was strengthened under Lee Myung-bak, who is conservative and a practicing Protestant. These religious institutions conform to the government’s orientations and directly serve the regime’s political interests.

In a nutshell:

PROGRESSIVE CHURCHES

• inspired by Minjung
• involved in democratization movements (1970-80)
• oppose the military regime
• suffer repression (arrests, censorship)
• struggle to develop (repressed)

CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES

• anti-communists
• refuse political involvement (in the name of neutrality)
• get closer to power for support
• receive state privileges
• are expanding rapidly thanks to the

A close, up-to-date relationship

The state mobilizes religious institutions in a utilitarian manner, illustrating the persistence of a proximity between politics and religion that highlights the continuation of neo-Confucian ideology within the functioning of the state. The integration of neo-Confucian elements (ritual ceremonies, symbolic hierarchization of public functions, respect for Confucian rites and ethics in political decision-making) into the political apparatus is also evident, facilitating collaboration between the state and religious institutions. Although the separation between the two spheres is officially enshrined in the Constitution, the reality bears witness to a close and enduring relationship.

This led to accusations of Jeonggyo yuchak (정교유착; 政敎癒着)(yuchak : adherence), literally “collusion between politics (정) and religion (교)” – The term yuchak (유착2⁾ emphasizes an overly close, even unhealthy relationship. This collusion arouses criticism from secular or progressive circles, as it contradicts the formal separation of institutions and seems to call into question the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis religion.

This situation is illustrated by a number of factors:

Indeed, one of the most significant elements concerns the religious ceremonies celebrated within the political institution, in particular the 국가조찬기도회(gukga nochan gidohoe), a prayer session for the nation organized by Protestant churches at the start of each new year. This ceremony traditionally brings together the most senior figures in the State, namely the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which underlines its symbolic significance.

The Gukga nochan gidohoe

The history of this event bears witness to its evolution and gradual politicization.

-In 1966, the first prayer meeting for the President was held, directly inspired by the American model of the National Prayer Breakfast. On this occasion, Pastor C.K. Kim declared that “the Lord has watched over the success of the military revolution”, thus insisting on the religious legitimization of political power.

-From 1968 until 1974, this prayer became an annual event.

-As early as 1973, it began to be broadcast live on television, and the messages delivered took an overtly political turn, as evidenced by Pastor C.K Kim’s appeal for divine blessing: “may the Yusin revolution succeed under God’s blessing”.

-In 1976, the ceremony was renamed from “Prayer for the President” to “Prayer for the Nation”.

-More recently, in 2003, the Morning Prayer for the Nation Association was set up to organize this annual event.

Beyond ceremonies, religious influence is also exerted in the public and urban planning spheres. A particularly telling example is the exceptional renovation permit granted to the SaRang Protestant Church (사랑의교회), which highlights the ability of certain religious institutions to influence state decisions and benefit from specific privileges.

Addenda

1. 종교 (宗敎): today “religion”, but previously referred to “Confucian doctrine” before the introduction of the Western concept. ↩︎
2. 유착 (癒着): Korean term for physical or metaphorical “adhesion”, used here to criticize a proximity deemed excessive between two spheres. ↩︎

Sources

• The impact of japanese colonial rule (1910-1940) upon the witness and growth of the Korean Presbyterian Church, Nam Sik Kim (2000)
• Protestantism in Korea and Japan from the 1880s to the 1940s: A Comparative Study of Differential Cultural Reception and Social Impact, Andrew Eungi Kim
• 헌법의 ‘정교분리원칙’의 의미 [The Meaning of ‘Separation of State and Religion’ in the Korean Constitution] , Sung Jung-Yeop, 법학논고 [Kyungpook National University Law Journal] (2020)
• Minjung Theology: A Korean Contextual Theology , A. SUNG PARK